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Abstract
In this paper we use a sample of administrative data coming from the `Dataware-
house labour market and social protection' and the microsimulation model MIMOSIS
to assess the labour supply e®ects of a reform of the rules for cumulating labour income
with survival pension as proposed in the Generations Pact. In a ¯rst step we estimate
a standard discrete choice labour supply model for several sub groups. Subsequently
we model the proposed reform in the tax and bene¯t rules and we predict the change
in desired labour supply of the targeted group. The reform has a signi¯cant positive
e®ect on the labour supply of widows, but the e®ects are quite weak amongst the
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11 Introduction
The Generations Pact (`Pacte de solidarit¶ e entre les g¶ en¶ erations' or `Generatiepact' ), for-
mally approved by the Belgian federal parliament on the 23rd of December 2005, contained
a reform proposal for survival pensions. In this paper we exploit a well established method-
ology to assess ex-ante the potential labour supply e®ects and the budgetary cost (including
potential feedback e®ects) of the proposed reform in the rules for cumulating labour income
and survival pensions. The methodology consists of estimating households' preferences with
respect to labour supply (i.e. leisure and consumption) under the current legislation. The
estimated preference parameters may then be used to predict the behavioural adjustment
to a change in the legislation. By aggregating behavioural change over the whole sample
and weighting with the sampling weights, we can estimate the expected change in labour
supply and expected earning back e®ects of the reform.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the current rules and the
proposed reform for cumulating labour income and survival pensions; in section 3 we describe
the data set, the selection procedure and provide some basic statistics; in section 4 we
introduce the microsimulation model (MIMOSIS), in section 5 we describe the econometric
structure of the labour supply model, while section 6 discusses the estimates. Finally,
sections 7 and 8 present the estimated impact on employment as well as the budgetary cost
of the reform. Section 9 concludes.
2 The current legislation and the proposed reform
Under current Belgian legislation, the amount of survival pension of eligible survivors de-
pends on the level of gross labour income. Basically, the survival pension is means tested on
individual gross labour income, which implies strong disincentives to supply labour amongst
2survival pensioners (at least in the formal sector). According to the 2001 legislation - the
reference year of the data and microsimulation model - there are two threshold levels: a
bottom threshold of 14,552.13 EUR and a top threshold corresponding to 115% of the bot-
tom threshold, i.e. 16,734.95 EUR 1 If gross labour income is below the ¯rst threshold the
survivor is entitled to the full bene¯t. If gross labour income is above the ¯rst threshold,
but does not exceed the second threshold, the full bene¯t is reduced with a taper rate
corresponding to the ratio of the amount exceeding the ¯rst ratio, to the ratio itself. The
taper thus increases linearly from 0 to 15% with increasing earnings. Finally, if gross labour
income is above the second threshold, the survivor bene¯t is completely tapered away. The
main elements of the proposed reform are (i) the joint assessment of labour income and
survival pension in the eligibility test, (ii) application of single threshold on this joint in-
come and (iii) a reduced taper rate of 50% on the bene¯t withdrawal in the range above
this threshold. The levels proposed by the reform are 26.200,00 EUR for people without
children and 29.910,80 EUR for people with children.2
To better understand the e®ects of the reform on the incentives to work, we outline
budget sets before and after the reform. The budget sets in ¯gures 1 to 3 show the e®ect
of the reform on a single without dependent children with an hourly wage of 7, 13 and 20
euros.3 All nominal variables are expressed in price levels of 2001.4 The values on the x axis
1The above rates apply to survival pensioners without dependent children; the rates are 18,189.93 EUR
and 20,918.42 EUR respectively, for survival pensioners with dependent children.
2Since data and reference year of the microsimulation model refer to 2001, we expressed the 2006 pre and
post reform thresholds in 2001 prices. This gives a threshold of 23.231,07 and 26.521,37 EUR for survivor
without and with dependent children respectively. For the conversion we used the consumer price index
computed by Belgostat (which was 90,27 in January 2001 and 101,81 in March 2006, yielding an index of
1,1278).
3The hourly wage of 7 EUR is just slightly above the minimum hourly wage (6.92 EUR/hour in 2001),
the hourly wage of 13 EUR corresponds to the sample mean, while the 20 EUR/hour wage rate corresponds
to the 9th decile cut point.
4Moreover, for ¯gures 1 to 3 the following assumptions were made:
1. the initial survival pension is assumed to be 10.000 EUR (a value which is close to the average survival
pension for widows in the wage earner regime, see table 1 below), gross labour income per year is
computed as the number of hours worked per week times the gross wage times 52 (i.e. no additional
holiday earnings taken into account);
3correspond to the amount of hours worked per week, whereas on the y axis we have yearly
disposable income.
The pictures clearly show the extent of the pre reform inactivity trap. For the low wage
worker, this trap was not very signi¯cant since the bene¯t withdrawal only occurs when
working overtime. The reform leaves the budget constraint almost unchanged, except for
the segment beyond 45 hours per week. Of course, the extent of the inactivity trap also
varies with the level of the survival pension, and for lower pension levels it might be a
relevant disincentive to work even for the low skilled. It is however for the medium and
high wage workers that the disincentive to work (or at least to work full time) is strongest.
In particular, for a medium skilled worker receiving a survival pension of 10,000 EUR the
disposable income is the same when working part time or when working full time (whereas
supplying a number of hours in between part time and full time would actually cause a fall
in disposable income). For a highly skilled worker, the extent of the trap is smaller, and
mostly concentrated between a part time and a 3/4 of full time.
The reform reduces the extent of the inactivity trap. The sudden drop in the budget
line disappears for all levels of income. It is therefore likely that the hours worked and to a
lesser extent participation will increase for those households who where out of employment
or working part time. However, the new budget constraint introduces an almost °at region
in the range where income was previously decreasing. This implies that some households
2. standard social security contribution rates are applied both to labour income and to pension bene¯ts
(i.e. 13,07% and 3,55% respectively);
3. personal income taxes are computed by applying a rate scheme on the sum of the net taxable labour
income and the net taxable survival pension, net of the personal tax credit and the tax credit on
replacement incomes; professional costs computed by a lump sum scheme;
4. taxes (without additional crisis surcharges) are set to zero if the credits are larger than the taxes to
be paid before application of the credits.
In the simulations of the baseline and of the reform on the real data, however, we do take into account
holiday earnings, while employee contributions are computed in a more re¯ned way (i.e. we take into
consideration the rebates on low wage social security contributions).
4who where supplying labour at full time might be induced to reduce their labour supply,
since a drop in labour supply would now cause a small drop in disposable income. .
There are, however, also households who might lose from the reform. Picture 4 to 6
show the case of a survival pensioner with respectively 8,000 EUR, 15,000 EUR and 20,000
EUR of survivor bene¯ts. The higher the pension income, the wider the range where the
survival pensioner will be negatively a®ected. With a survival pension of 20,000 EUR per
year (¯gure 6), for example, a medium wage survival pensioner will be negatively a®ected by
the reform if he or she works between 5 and 30 hours. Clearly the disincentives to working
longer hours disappear now, but at the same time the relative di®erence in income level
between working part time or not working at all, is smaller than before the reform.
The e®ect (whether positive or negative) and the magnitude of the reform on the labour
supply is therefore di±cult to predict ex-ante, due to the interaction of substitution and
income e®ects. We therefore need a model that identi¯es, for the relevant households, the
fundamental preferences, the magnitude of substitution and income e®ects caused by the
reform and, ¯nally, the individuals' labour supply elasticity. The following sections explain
how this model was constructed: the data used (section 3), the microsimulation model
(section 4) and the econometric speci¯cation (section 5).
3 The data: sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample on which the microsimulation model runs (MIMOSIS) was constructed by a two
step sampling procedure. First a random sample of 100,000 individuals was sampled from
the set of all individuals who, according to the National Register, were alive on January
1st 2002 and known to have their main place of residence in Belgium. Individuals in this
random sample could be either living in private or collective households. In a second step,
5the sample was extended with all household members of those individuals sampled in the
¯rst step and living in a private household. The ¯nal sample comprises a set of 305,019
individuals. Sample weights have been constructed to in°ate the sample to the population
level. For this sample, a data set with micro data from various administrative sources was
constructed. Apart from some household characteristics taken from the National Register
(age, sex, relationship between household members, region and population density in the
residence area), the data set consists of variables taken from the `Datawarehouse labour
market and social protection'. At the time of writing, the data set we dispose of contains
a) labour market income and a number of labour market characteristics for wage earners in
either the private or public sector, b) some labour market characteristics of self employed
but no gross earnings of these self employed and c) information on various social bene¯ts
such as unemployment bene¯ts, sickness and disability bene¯ts and pensions. All variables
in our data set contain registrations for the tax bene¯t year 2001.
The variables with information on pensioners are provided by the Pensioenkadaster to
the Datawarehouse. This allowed to identify individuals entitled to a survival pension in
2001. 5
Survival pensions may be claimed by single widows and widowers who have not remar-
ried, provided that the deceased spouse had ful¯lled minimum employment and contribution
requirements. The rights to a survival pension can be obtained in three di®erent employ-
ment regimes: a) as wage earner in the private and public sector, b) as self employed and
c) as civil servant. For most observed survival pensions, the regime in which the right was
generated can be identi¯ed with the available data. It is possible to cumulate one's own
5We consider as survivor pensioners only the widows and widowers who are entitled to a legal survival
pension according to Belgian laws. Neither the current legislation, nor the reform would in fact a®ect survival
pensions obtained from extralegal provisions (the second or third pillar system) and survival pensions
for which the rights were obtained according to foreign laws or according to the laws of supranational
organizations.
6retirement pension with a survivor bene¯t. In this case we classify the person as retired.
Those who receive a survival pension can complement it with a retirement pension, at the
age of retirement, if they are entitled to a retirement bene¯t. The total amount of the sur-
vival pension and the retirement pension together is limited to 110% of the survival pension
that would be obtained in case of a full time career of the deceased spouse (see FOD Sociale
Zekerheid, 2001, p. 263)
Table 1 shows that by means of our sample we estimate the number of widowers and
widows in 2001 at 133,532 and 596,532 respectively. However the number of widowers
and widows available for work is quite small: 18,418 and 84,618 respectively when we
consider as available for work individuals who are not disabled, retired or pre-retired. The
group of widowers and widows available for work and claiming a survivor bene¯t is further
disaggregated on the basis of the scheme under which they are entitled to a survival pension.
There are of course also widows and widowers who are not receiving any survivor bene¯t.
Since we only observe actual payments, it is however di±cult to infer whether the absence
of a survivor pension for widows and widowers is due to lack of entitlement, problems in
take-up or simply too high gross earnings.
We assumed that widows and widowers currently not working and not receiving a sur-
vivor bene¯t are not entitled to a survivor bene¯t. This group will therefore not be a®ected
by the reform. We assumed that widows and widowers currently working and not claiming
a bene¯t were all entitled to a bene¯t. We imputed as entitlement the average bene¯t,
computed separately for males and for females.
This point should not be underestimated: the potential negative responses to the reform
would be concentrated amongst survival pensioners currently working and not claiming a
bene¯t due to their labour income. The latter could indeed be induced by the reform to
7reduce their labour supply. A reduction in labour supply would come at the cost of a
smaller drop in disposable income compared to the pre-reform scenario. In order not to
underestimate this e®ect we preferred being on the safe side by imputing the entitlement to
the bene¯t to widows and widowers who are currently in work and not claiming their bene¯t
due to their high labour income. In these cases we imputed the average claimed bene¯t,
computed separately for males and females. As shown in table 1 the imputation concerns
11 % of females (8,190 out of 75,572) but almost 89% of males (10,306 out of 11,356).
The above hypothesis is very conservative with respect to the possible cost of the re-
form, and expected e®ect on labour supply, since it is likely that there is some endogenous
selection mechanism into the group of workers and the group of non workers, and that as
a consequence in the group of non workers there will be a higher percentage of widows and
widowers who are either not entitled at all, or that are entitled to lower survivor pensions.
The reform concerns a small number of individuals: widows and widowers available for
the labour market either claiming or entitled to a survivor pension. Following the imputation
we only have 11,365 males and 75,572 females. These correspond respectively to 235 and
1,516 cases in our sample.
Since additional selection criteria, needed for the purpose of estimating a labour supply
model, will further reduce the group targeted by the reform that can be modeled, we es-
timated the labour supply model on the whole population. The main assumption in this
case, is that the preferences of males and females do not depend on their civil status (i.e.
on whether married, single, separated or divorced).6
Although civil status is assumed not to a®ect behaviour, the `de facto' composition of the
households is assumed to a®ect the behaviour of the individual that compose it. Widows
6A priori we were not able to identify any reason why the preference structure of widows and widowers
should be di®erent from those of other individuals, once we control for other observable di®erences. The
assumption is nevertheless di±cult to test econometrically. See section 5 for a further discussion.
8and widowers, just like other persons may live as single individuals or as couples (or in
di®erent - less common - household types). In case they live in couples (either married or de
facto couples) the labour supply of both partners must be modeled as a joint decision.7 The
labour supply models were therefore estimated for three groups separately: single males,
single females and couples. The term single should not be misunderstood: this typology
includes also single mothers and single fathers, as well as individuals living with their old
parents, who have retired from the labour market. The principal characteristics of single
households is that they are composed of only one individual available for the labour market
and does not have a partner.
Figure 7 gives a visual explanation of the selection procedure and of the modeling strat-
egy. In order to be part of the estimation sub-sample, an individual must be in working age
(18-65) and be available for the labour market, i.e. he or she may not be (pre)retired nor
sick or disabled. Youngsters under the age of 25 who are not employees, self employed or
registered as unemployed are assumed to be in full time education and not available for the
labour market. Children over 25 with unde¯ned professional status are just assumed to be
inactive and thus potentially available for the labour market. This assumption allows us to
neglect simultaneity issues of educational investment and labour supply. In modeling labour
supply we also exclude the self employed, since we have no information on the hours worked.
Self employed are thus treated as having a ¯xed labour supply. Employees, unemployed and
inactives are treated as having a °exible labour supply. For couples we of course also have
the possibility of mixed cases. For example a household may consist of a self employed
7The unitary setting is increasingly being questioned by economic theory. It is argued that unitary
models are not compatible with the individualism that is at the heart of microeconomic theory. Beninger
and Laisney (2004) have recently extended the above labour supply model to joint labour supply decisions
and intra household welfare allocation, within a collective setting. For an application with Belgian data,
see Vermeulen (2006).
9husband and of an employed wife, or vice versa. These groups are currently not modeled.8
Besides the `standard' cases of singles and couples there is a residual group of households
which includes di®erent types of families and forms of cohabitation: this include homosexual
couples or cohabiting °atmates, brothers and sisters or other relatives sharing a same hous-
ing arrangement, and mainly couples with grown up children also available for the labour
market. From the labour supply perspective, this group tends to be rather heterogenous,
and the degree of `unity' of the household (i.e. the extent to which the income of one mem-
ber in°uences the decisions of the other members) is unknown and/or di±cult to deduce.
In other words, it is not possible to determine whether labour supply should be modeled
as an individual or joint decision. We therefore follow the bulk of the literature on ex-ante
evaluations and decide not to model these households.
Table 2 summarizes the selection process for the whole population, while table 3 provides
similar information for the target group. The target group is de¯ned as the set of widows
and widowers either entitled or claiming a survivor bene¯t, who are available for the labour
market and whose labour supply is being modeled. As shown in table 2, our modeling
strategy will allow us to model the labour supply of almost 70% of the whole population.
For the moment, however, we are able to model around 63% of males and 57% of females of
working age - but over 75% and 65% of widowers and widows of working age. As revealed by
table 3 there are only few widowers and even less widows in the subgroups `men in couples'
and `women in couple'. These two groups include widows and widowers living with a retired,
sick or self employed partner, i.e. a partner having a ¯xed labour supply. It is therefore
acceptable to predict the e®ect of the reform using the models for couples, single males
and single females alone. The main problem is the relatively high number of widows living
8Following the integration of the incomes of self-employed it will be possible to estimate a labour supply
model for these two additional groups as well. These will be treated like singles, but taking joint household
income as an explanatory variable.
10in the residual (`other') household typology (658 out of 1,447). This is mainly composed
of widows living with grown up children and their labour supply is not modeled for the
moment. These cases are not discarded, but their labour supply is assumed not to respond
to changes in the budget constraint.
The descriptive statistics of the the sub samples that will be used for the estimation of
the labour supply model are presented in table 4. Table 5, on the other hand, produces the
same statistics for the sub sample of modeled widows and widowers. In particular, table 4
shows us three sets of information: the demographic characteristics of the households, the
professional status of the head of the household and eventually of the spouse and ¯nally the
amount of hours worked. For reasons that will become clear in the following sections, the
hours worked have been discretized in intervals of ten hours. Table 5 also shows the share
of households in which a survivor bene¯t is claimed or not, and disaggregates the hours
supplied for the two sub groups. Indeed the di®erence in labour supply of bene¯t claimants
and non claimants is striking, both for males and females.
4 MIMOSIS
MIMOSIS is a microsimulation model for the Belgian social security and personal income tax
system, running on the administrative dataset described in section 3. Since the data go back
to the tax bene¯t year 2001, the legislation that is currently modeled as baseline legislation,
is that of 2001. The current version of the model aims to cover 6 policy domains: a) social
security contributions, b) unemployment bene¯ts, c) sickness and disability bene¯ts, d)
family bene¯ts, e) existence minima and f) personal income taxes.9
9The version of the model used in this paper is a preliminary one. We mention the most important
lacunas. First, information on self employment income is still missing. Second, in some modules observed
bene¯ts instead of simulated bene¯ts are used. Thirdly, existence minima are attributed to individuals too
generously because the take up behaviour of these bene¯ts is not modeled. Yet, these de¯ciencies should
11The use of a microsimulation model in this kind of analysis is indispensable for two rea-
sons. First, it allows to translate a complex real world tax bene¯t system into the budget
constraints as presented in Figures 1 to 6 in section 3. The - often hidden - interactions
between di®erent income components and eligibility rules need a level of detail in the pro-
gram only available in a genuine microsimulation model. Secondly, the underlying database
with micro information on a representative sample of households or individuals allows to
complement the standard aggregate results (e.g. for the budget) with a rich and detailed
distributional analysis.
A key variable in the labour supply model of sections 5 and 6 and in its application in
section 7 to the survivor pensioners, is the gross wage. For the individuals active in the
labour market we determined the gross wage by dividing gross labour income by the number
of contractual hours, two variables which are both registered by the Datawarehouse. For the
unemployed and inactives, we ¯rst tried to reconstruct their gross hourly wage by retrieving
the last recorded hourly wage for those who had been active on the labour market before as
wage earner. If both current and past labour market information was lacking, we assumed
the individual could at least obtain the minimum hourly wage (6.92 EUR in 2001). We
had to make this assumption for 22% of the sample on which the labour supply model was
estimated. However, and not surprisingly, for the sample of widows and widowers in working
age and receiving a survival pension (and not self employed), the imputation was necessary
for 62% of the individuals.10 Overall the average gross hourly wage (either registered or
reconstructed) amounts to 13,00 EUR (in 2001 prices).
not have a major impact on the results of this simulation, since it is mainly concerned with survival bene¯ts
and gross labour income.
10We are aware that the standard procedure to impute missing wages, is to estimate a wage equation
(either a linear regression or a Heckman two stage wage equation). However, since one of the crucial
explanatory variables of the wage equation, level of education, is missing we could not fall back on this
technique.
12Assuming that the hourly gross wage stays constant across di®erent working time op-
tions, we computed gross labour income for discrete intervals of weekly labour supply. The
intervals ranged from 0 to 50 hours, in steps of 10 hours.11 If gross labour income of survival
pensioners is in between the lower and the upper threshold, we recompute the theoretical
maximum entitlement by adding the fraction of bene¯t that was tapered away. To distin-
guish survival pensioners with and without dependent children (see section 2) we used the
number of dependent children according to the personal income tax legislation. If dispos-
able income of the household is below the existence minimum, it is complemented such that
the existence minimum is reached. The existence minimum itself varies with the household
situation.
5 Labour Supply Models
Discrete choice models of labour supply are based on the assumption that individuals in
a household i can choose among J+1 working hours (non-participation denoted by j = 0
and J positive hours denoted by j = 1;:::J). For each discrete choice j, the net income of
household i, denoted Cij (equivalent to aggregate household consumption in a static frame-
work) is computed by tax-bene¯t microsimulation techniques so that leisure-consumption
preferences can be estimated. The approach has become standard practice as it provides a
straightforward way to account for the nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets of complex tax
and bene¯t systems when modeling individual and joint labour supplies of couples. In the
latter case, the choice of working hours is given by the J+1
2 combinations of each partner's
labour supply; see van Soest (1995). Precisely, the utility Vij derived by household i from
11The introduction of possible labour supply above the legal maximum of 38 hours a week for a single
full time job re°ects the possibility of a combination of multiple parttime jobs. That people in practice do
combine multiple jobs in the Belgian labour market is illustrated in Vermandere and Stevens (2002).
13making choice j is assumed to depend on a function U of partners' leisures Lfij, Lmij,
disposable income Cij and household characteristics Zi, and on a random term ²ij:
Vij = U(Lfij;Lmij;Cij;Zi) + ²ij:
If the error term ²ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across al-
ternatives and households according to an EV-I distribution, the probability that alternative
k is chosen by household i is given by (McFadden, 1974):





The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and
maximized to estimate the parameters of the function U. When actual working hours are
used to de¯ne the individual leisure terms, the econometrician assumes that individuals
freely choose their working hours and face no demand-side constraints. The approach is
that of a pure - unconstrained - labour supply model.
In the following, we assume a quadratic speci¯cation of the utility function as in Blun-
dell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Hence, the utility function of a couple has the
following form:
Uij = ®cCij + ®ccC
2





+®clfCijLfij + ®clmCijLmij + ®lmfLfijLmij ¡ ¯mj ¡ ¯fj:
We assume that preferences vary across households through taste-shifters on income and
gender speci¯c leisure coe±cients:
14®c = ®c0 + ®c1X1 (2)
®lf = ®lf0 + ®lf1X2
®lm = ®lm0 + ®lm1X3:
where X1, X2, and X3 are vectors including age, number of children and elderly in
di®erent age class, region and size of city of residence.
The utility function and the choice probability of a single individual are derived in the
same way as above. The only di®erence is that the structural utility term contains only two
variables: consumption and individual leisure:
Uij = ®cCij + ®ccC
2
ij + ®lLij + ®llL
2
ij + ®clCijLij ¡ ¯j: (3)
with the same taste-shifters on income and leisure coe±cients.
In the case of singles we restricted the option set to 6 discrete choices: 0, 10, 20, 30, 40,
50. In the case of couples, the option set included 36 alternatives.
We follow van Soest (1995) and introduce dummy variables (¯j). These are supposed
to capture non monetary characteristics of the jobs: °exibility, working environment, work-
ing conditions and relative availability (i.e. the associated search costs). In particular we
included one dummy for regular part-time (20 hours per week), one dummy for full-time
position (40 hours per week) and one dummy for the irregular working time (i.e. 10, 30 or
50 hours per week). In the estimation we do not consider potential e®ects of unobserved
heterogeneity which implies that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) prop-
erty holds. However, Haan (2006) has shown that labour supply elasticities do not di®er
signi¯cantly when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced.
15Other than perfect information and rational (optimizing) behavior, the model is based
on a set of additional simplifying hypotheses:
1. lack of adjustment costs (economic agents may freely adjust their labour supply strat-
egy without incurring additional costs);
2. lack of adjustment dynamics (economic agents may immediately adjust their labour
supply strategy: there is no short term or long term path dependency);
3. lack of demand side constraints (each agent supplying zero hours of work does so
because this is his/her optimal labour supply decision;
4. labour supply is a static decision (economic agents are not a®ected by long run con-
siderations).
The above hypotheses are not innocuous and many would argue that they are not very
realistic, especially in the framework of the Belgian labour market. On the other hand,
it may be argued that the above hypotheses are `optimistic' hypotheses. In this sense our
estimate might be interpreted as an upper bound to the potential labour supply and earning
back e®ect of the reform. Finally, let us recall that given the small sample size of widows
and widowers, we introduced the additional hypothesis that survival pensioners living alone
have the same preferences as singles, while survival pensioners living as a couple have the
same preferences as legally married or `de facto' couples.
6 Preference structure and labour supply elasticities
The coe±cients of a discrete choice model have a less intuitive interpretation than in linear
models and little can be said about the magnitude of the coe±cients, however some elements
16may be captured from the sign of the coe±cients. Table 6 shows the regression coe±cients
for single males, table 7 for single females and table 8 for couples.
The marginal utility of consumption is positive over the whole range of incomes in the
data set. In particular a negative sign on the squared leisure and income terms implies
decreasing marginal utility of leisure and consumption. The most important element for the
consistency of the model and for its ability to predict changes is that the utility function is
globally concave in consumption (or disposable income - in a static model). Concavity was
respected by over 99% of the sample. As stressed by van Soest (1995) several factors could
explain that the choice function is not globally concave in leisure. Amongst other things, the
fact that some value may be attached to working some amount of hours due to dominant
social values. In particular between 20 to 30% of the sample did not respect concavity
in leisure. Note also the positive sign of the cross leisure terms in the utility function of
couples: the non market time of partners is complementary and not a substitute.
Other elements may also be captured from the regression coe±cients. The taste shifters
for both the consumption and (to a lesser extent) leisure coe±cients increases with age, but
starts decreasing after the age of 50: the inverse U relation applies both to couples and
single males. This relationship is consistent with the traditional life cycle hypothesis, but is
probably also a®ected by the correlation between productivity and age. For single females
the e®ect of age on the preference for income and leisure is reversed. It increases over the
whole range. Since we control for the `dual burden' e®ect (number and age of children and
number and age of elderly people), it is likely that this relationship captures some di®erences
in the labour market institutions, including the costs of reentering the labour market after
childbirth.
The preference for leisure appears to be di®erent for males and females. This di®erence
17is not only evident in the value of the constant in the leisure term of couples (negative for
males and positive for females), but to a lesser extent it also applies to single males and
single females. The latter seem to have a higher preference for leisure than the former, which
might to some extent respect di®erence in social stigma associated to inactivity of males
and females. The preference for leisure also increases with the presence of small children
(for single females) and elderly people in the households (for both single females and single
males), which is consistent with the additional caring responsibilities that single adults may
encounter.12 In the case of couples the number of small children tends to increase the taste
for work for fathers, whereas it increases the taste for leisure of mothers (for mothers in
couples it is not only the case for small children, but for grown up children as well). Also,
the number of older individuals in the household seems only to a®ect the labour supply of
females (with the impact of the over 75 being stronger than the impact of the elderly in the
65-75 range). These results seem consistent with the evidence that gender specialization in
market and non market time tend to resist within couples. Di®erences between single males
and single females, on the contrary, appear to be much less pronounced.
Living in Flanders increases the preference for working, as is the case when living in
small centers (the reference category in the regression). This is also consistent with lower
activity rates for Wallonia, Brussels and in bigger cities in general. Tentative explanations
might point in the direction of smaller social stigma associated with unemployment and non
activity in medium to big cities in general and in Brussels in particular. Besides that, the
regional dummies might also capture some demand side constraint: the unemployment rate
in Brussels is indeed higher than in Wallonia and in Flanders.
We also speci¯ed a model with the dummy variable `widow or widower'. The latter
12Note that although we speak of leisure time, the preference for leisure should be interpreted as preference
for non market activities, as we are not able to distinguish between caring and home production and actual
leisure.
18was introduced as a taste shifter in the linear coe±cient for consumption and leisure. The
estimate was not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for single adult males or for males living
with a partner. Also widows living with a partner did not show signi¯cantly di®erent
preferences than other married or unmarried women living with their partner. For single
females, however, the dummy variable widow turned out to be signi¯cative. Note that this
does not necessarily imply that the preferences of widows are di®erent. As in the case of
the regional variables, being a widow could capture some other factors (e.g. depression,
prolonged weak labour market attachment). Since we could not control for these factors in
an appropriate way, we decided to exclude variables whose in°uence on preferences could
not be explained or justi¯ed. For a detailed discussion on the risk of misspeci¯cation in
structural models of labour supply, see Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2006)
The goodness of ¯t of a discrete choice model may not be judged by the pseudo-R2. At
most such ¯gure may be used to judge the goodness of ¯t between a group of models: in
other terms it is a relative ¯gure, and not an absolute one. In order to judge the prediction
power of the model, one often compares the observed and the predicted frequencies. Figure 8
and ¯gure 9 show the observed and predicted frequencies for single males and single females
respectively. Figures 10 and 11 show the observed and predicted frequencies for males and
females living in a couple where both partners have a °exible labour supply.13
13Predicted frequencies results from aggregating individual probabilities over the whole sample, whereas
observed frequencies simply represent the frequency of the observed choice over the whole sample. We also
estimated the model on 5 hours intervals and a simple inactivity, part-time and full-time model. In all the
cases results were surprisingly similar: the sign and magnitude of the coe±cients remained the same for the
di®erent speci¯cations, although the prediction power slightly decreased when using 5 hours intervals. The
10 hours intervals, nevertheless produced an extremely good ¯t and at the same time where su±cient to
capture the e®ect of the reform on the budget constraints.
196.1 Predicted Elasticities
Another way to interpret the estimated parameters is to look at labour supply elasticities.
Elasticities may not be derived analytically, since we do not have a reduced functional form
for the labour supply function. However, it is possible to compute labour supply elasticities
numerically. In particular we simulated a 1% hourly wage increase and recomputed the
expected labour supply following such a wage shock. Participation and total hour elastic-
ities are presented in table 9.14 The average ¯gures are substantially higher than recently
estimated labour supply elasticities, both for Belgium and for other EU countries, see Orsini
(2006). In the survey of estimations of couples' labour supply based on structural modeling,
the author ¯nds that labour supply elasticities of females in couple vary between .3 and .7,
whereas the labour supply of males in couple varies between .08 and .2. The larger labour
supply elasticity of females in couples has been largely documented in the recent literature
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Moreover it is usually the case that labour supply elastic-
ities of singles (both males and females) approach those of males in couples, since they all
are primary earners, see Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2006). The high predicted
labour supply elasticities of single males and females come therefore as a surprise. One of
the explanations might be that our sample is based on administrative information. Some of
those registered as inactive, could indeed be employed in the informal economy, while others
may be currently enrolled in educational programmes, but may appear as inactive. More-
over, for the moment, we decided to exclude households with economically active grown up
children. It is likely that in some of these cases the grown up children are de facto living
14With total hour elasticity we mean the percentage increase in hours supplied following a 1% increase in
the gross wage, whereas with participation elasticity we mean the increase in the employment rate following
the same increase in the gross wage. For example a total hour elasticity of .7 and a participation elasticity
of .2 mean that if gross wages were to increase by 1%, the total amount of supplied hours would increase
by .7% whereas the total number of participants in the labour market would increase by .2%: that implies
that an employment rate of 50% would increase to 50.1%.
20alone but are still registered in the parental home, or they are still living at home, but are
independent from their parents with respect to labour market behaviour. This might ex-
plain the relatively high share of inactives amongst the population of singles. The inactivity
rate reported in table 4 (16.99% of single males and 36.43% of single females), seems indeed
quite high with respect to other statistical sources not based on administrative data. Such a
high inactivity rate might be the cause for a biased estimation of the participation elasticity
and hence total labour supply elasticity. This, however, should not have a large negative
e®ect on the estimated labour supply elasticity of a particular target group, see Bargain,
Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2006).
The distribution of labour supply elasticities by decile of household disposable income
is broadly consistent with the evidence of larger labour supply elasticities amongst the less
skilled households; see Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m (2004).
Table 10 also presents the labour supply elasticities for the sub sample targeted by the
reform. The target group includes widows and widowers available for the labour market
(but not self employed) either claiming or entitled to a survivor bene¯t.
The labour supply elasticities of the target group are smaller than those of the whole
population for males and for females in couples. Single females and single males in the target
group, on the other hand, show higher labour supply elasticities than the corresponding
group in the whole population.
The high labour supply elasticity are a consequence of the individual characteristics and
of the speci¯c budget constraint faced. In particular the presence of out of labour income
tend to induce to higher labour supply elasticities.
Note that average elasticities might nevertheless be misleading, especially in when deal-
ing with reforms that a®ect di®erently the low skilled and the high skilled. The reform might
21induce a stronger increase in labour supply on the low-medium skilled population (i.e. the
sub group that tends to have relatively higher elasticities), while the negative change in
labour supply should a priori be concentrated amongst the skilled population, characterized
by lower labour supply elasticities.
In the following section we will see how employment and the amount of hours worked will
change after the reform, when the institutional disincentives to work are partially removed.
7 Employment E®ects of the Reform
Table 11 shows the overall employment level and the number of hours worked (in FTE -
Full Time Equivalent positions) before and after the reform. The reform can be expected
to increase the labour supply by 830 FTE positions. The increase in participation plays an
important role in explaining this increase, as 657 survival pensioners are predicted to enter
the labour market. This shows that in the pre reform scenario, many survival pensioners
preferred not to enter the labour market, rather than working short hours. This is probably
associated with the ¯xed costs of labour supply, which make part time and marginal part
time relatively less attractive than full time positions (see the ¯ coe±cients in the regression
tables).
The additional employment is almost entirely coming from widows living in single house-
holds (782 FTE positions) and to a lesser extent from widows with a survival pension living
with a partner (64 FTE positions). The reform can thus broadly be described as a reform
targeting the female population in general and the female population living in single house-
holds in particular. The increase in labour supply of males in couples corresponds to just
about 17 units, a ¯gure that could be expected not to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero,
while single males - the group that had the highest pre reform employment rate (amongst
22bene¯t claimants) - decrease their labour supply by about 26 FTE position. At the same
time however participation increases. Clearly the reform induces two movements: a move-
ment towards an increase in labour supply (or even participation for the formerly inactive)
and a movement towards a decrease in labour supply amongst the full time working popu-
lation. The analysis of in°ows and out°ows of labour supply and of the characterisitics of
the individuals increasing or decreasing their labour supply will be the core of the following
section.
7.1 Distributional impact
In this section we further disaggregate the net e®ects in increases and decreases of labour
supply. Table 12, table 13 and table 14 show the relative contribution to the net e®ects
by age group, by hourly wage and by survivor pension level. Finally table 15 disaggregates
in°ows and out°ows by quintile of household disposable income (the latter was equivalised
by dividing with the squared root of household size). In the tables the `target' group refers
to all households with one widow or widower entitled to a survivor pensioner (although not
always currently claiming it), whose labour supply has been modeled.
The size of the male labour supply e®ect is far too small to singleout any particular
trend. In the following discussion we will therefore only focus on the female labour supply.
The movement into the labour market is concentrated amongst the females aged between
45 to 55, and to a lesser extent amongst women aged 55 to 65. The strongest movement
out of the labour market comes mainly from the widows aged 45 to 55, but the net e®ect
for the latter age group is positive: more than half of the total increase in labour supply is
to be expected amongst widows in this age group.
With respect to hourly wage, the biggest positive contribution comes from the medium-
23low-skilled i.e. from the widows with imputed or current minimum wage in ranging from
above the minimum wage to 12 EUR/hour. In particular more than half the total net
increase in labour supply (485 FTE) comes from widows with wages between the minimum
wage and 10 EUR/hour. Much of the reduction in labour supply, on the other hand, comes
from widows with an hourly wage in the range from 16 to 18 or higher. As seen from ¯gures
4 to 6, this group may be negatively a®ected by the reform, if the level of the pension is
su±ciently high. Otherwise, in case of full time participation, the reform does provide an
incentive to reduce labour supply for high skilled widows, as this will now cause only a
small reduction in disposable income. As expected, for very high wage levels the incentive
to withdraw from the labour market is smaller than for medium-high wages.
It is also interesting to see how the system of incentives provided by the reform varies
as a function of survivor bene¯t. The largest increase in labour supply, in this case, comes
from widows with survivor bene¯ts ranging from 6,000 to 14,000 EUR per year. Almost
228 FTE positions, however, come from the group of widows with a survivor pension in the
range of 10,000 to 12,000 EUR. Negative responses, i.e. reductions in labour supply, are
mainly coming from widows with survivor pensions greater than 14,000 EUR per year.
Finally, when looking at the distribution of the impact by income quintile we see that
very little happens in the ¯rst quintile. The largest increase in labour supply comes partially
from the 4th quintile (+442.6 FTE) and to a lower extent from the 3rd quintile (+249.1).
The majority of the out°ow, on the other hand, comes from the 5th quintile (-124.8 FTE).
We may therefore broadly identify the characteristics of the survivor pensioner which is
most likely to respond positively to the reform: it's a widow, not living with a partner, aged
between 45 and 55, with a medium to low hourly wage, but a rather high survivor bene¯t
which places her in the higher end of the income distribution.
24The strongest negative e®ects, on the other hand, are likely to come from elderly medium
to highly skilled women (wage ranging from 16 to 18 EUR/hour and above), with high
survivor bene¯t (over 14,000 EUR/year) and household disposable income in the top decile
of the distribution.
Finally, table 16 shows how disposable income is modi¯ed after the reform and after
behavioural adjustments. The column target in the ¯rst two panels reports the sum of
the households which are a®ected by the reform in a static framework. In other words it
reports the sum of the households which will experience a change in disposable income at
their given labour supply. The change in disposable income is then subdivided in 6 brackets
(0;5], (5;10], (10;15], (15;20], (20;25] and (25;1] according to the size of the percentage
change in disposable income. Clearly the losers from the reform are concentrated in the
upper quintile, and the size of the loss is always less than 10%. The signi¯cant bene¯ts
(more than 15% increase in disposable income) are spread between the second and the
fourth quintile, with the highest concentration being in the third quintile. The very lowest
decile is not a®ected by the reform, according to our data.
The column target in the last two panels has a di®erent meaning than in the two previous
panels: it sums up all households which are a®ected by the reform in some segment of their
budget constraint, irrespective of their current labour supply. In other words it is the sum
of households for which the system of incentives is modi¯ed by the reform. The change
in disposable income now includes changes coming from the reform and from behaviour.
The structure of the ¯nancial gains has a less clear pattern. Mostly, however, the reform
a®ects widows (and widowers) in the second and third quintile positively. Interestingly,
when considering behavioural reactions, the ¯rst quintile also shows signi¯cant increases in
disposable income. The strongest reduction in disposable income, on the other hand, are
25concentrated in the two top quintiles.
Note that we do not use the behavioural model for a welfare evaluation of the reform. It
should be stressed that a priori a decrease in disposable income may be associated with both
decreases and increases in the level of welfare, and vice versa. The distribution of ¯nancial
gains and losses should therefore be interpreted with caution, as a reduction in disposable
income does not mean a reduction in welfare, and vice versa.
8 Budgetary Costs
We ¯nally turn to the budgetary costs of the reform. In table 17 we show some budgetary
aggregates (employee's and employers' social security contributions, gross social bene¯ts and
personal income tax) before and after the reform, as well as after the behavioural reactions.
The cost of the reform is in the order of 22.5 million Euros, if we do not take into account
behavioral reactions
The cost of the reform is mainly driven by a net increase in spending on social bene¯ts.
Although some households actually lose from the reform, a larger number of households
bene¯t from the rede¯nition of the thresholds and are now entitled to larger survival bene¯ts.
However, income taxation and to a lesser extent social security contributions levied on gross
survivor bene¯ts partially reduce the cost of the reform.
However, if we allow workers to °exibly adjust their labour supply to respond to the
new system of incentives, the budgetary cost is almost halved: the increase in hours worked
generates an increase in gross labour income of about 15 millions Euros, i.e. almost 1,600
EUR/month per FTE. Note that this ¯gure corresponds to an hourly wage of about 9.98
EUR (i.e. the hourly wage of a medium/low skilled worker).
The increase in employment generates an increase in SSCs both of employees and em-
26ployers (1.8 and 6.4 million Euros respectively) and a further increase in personal income tax.
Moreover, expenditures on gross social bene¯ts will go down once we allow for behavioural
reactions: given the less stringent rules for cumulating labour and pension income, in fact,
survival pensioners are now ready to lose part of the full entitlement and combine it with
income from work. The net e®ect is a budgetary cost of about 11 million EUR.
Let us recall that these ¯gures are punctual estimates, and we do not provide a con¯dence
interval. These could be generated by bootstrapping from the estimated distribution of
the parameters. However, given the size of the movements out of the labour market, it
could be reasonably expected that both the employment e®ect and the budgetary e®ect
are signi¯cantly positive. The pool of individuals which could contribute negatively (i.e.
reduce their labour supply) is in fact very small and already largely overestimated by our
`conservative' imputation procedure. Assuming somewhat lower reactions amongst non
claiming employed widows and widowers and a more or less equal response amongst the
survivor pensioners currently not modeled, it is likely that the cost of the reform would be
further reduced.
9 Conclusions
The proposed reform eliminates a disincentive to work faced by widows and widowers entitled
to a survival pension. Under the current system, a worker has no incentive to supply an
amount of hours that would bring his/her labour income over the upper threshold, since
this would result in an income loss.
The proposed reform eliminates the income loss, by lowering the withdrawal rate and
conditioning the means test on the sum of gross labour income and survivor bene¯t. More-
over, the upper threshold disappears, thus avoiding a sudden drop of the survivor bene¯t.
27The new budget constraints present a moderate slope in the previous `trap-range'. Ex
ante it is di±cult to predict the e®ects of the reform: it depends on the relative weight of
substitution and income e®ect, as well as on the distribution of the target population over
the budget constraint. Survival pensioners supplying labour at full time or over time may
indeed decide to reduce their labour supply, without having to su®er an all too large income
drop. On the other hand, inactive survival pensioners and survival pensioners which were
supplying work at part-time or marginal part-time levels in order not to lose the bene¯t
entitlement, could now decide to increase their labour supply without su®ering major income
losses.
According to our estimates, the targeted population responds well to the change of
incentives. Total hours worked could increase by over 800 units in FTE. This ¯gure is
not that impressive in absolute terms, but it should be brought to mind that the targeted
population is indeed quite small. Moreover, the budgetary cost of this activation policy
is modest (and yet overestimated). Clearly, the reform of survivor bene¯t can be broadly
described as a `making work pay' policy, in as far as it aims to make work ¯nancially more
attractive. The cost of these activation policies tends to be very high. Orsini (2006) reviews
di®erent activation policies in EU countries. The cost per job created is often in the range
of 100,000 to 200,000 EUR/year. In the case of the survivor pension, the cost is just about
13,000 EUR/year. The reform has a positive e®ect given that the pool of workers which is
likely to respond negatively is small: only about 20% of the sample of widows is working
more than part-time. In the case of widowers the percentage is much higher, about 66%, but
very few will reduce labour supply following the reform. The proposed reform is therefore
a good example of how labour supply may be increased with a minor budgetary cost by
simply removing disincentives to work built in the tax bene¯t system.
28Recently, the minister decided to postpone the implementation of the reform. On the
one hand, in fact, the policy was originally meant to primarily activate survivor pensioners
with a low survivor bene¯t and low disposable income. However, the biggest net e®ect in
terms of labour supply, is clearly not coming from this group. On the other hand, the reform
also implies a loss in disposable income for some survivor pensioners. Such a `political cost'
must then be weighted with the potential bene¯ts of the reform in terms of labour supply.
Finally, as argued by the minister, survivor bene¯ts need to be profoundly rethought as an
instrument of social protection in a society where increasing female employment and family
instability are rapidly outdating the single male breadwinner model. The ¯nal decision was
therefore to propose in the legislation to come, a more ambitious reform of the survivor
bene¯ts, to be implemented in the general framework of the individualization of social
security rights.
29Table 1: Widows and widowers
Widowers
Not weighted Weighted
Number of cases Frequencies Number of cases Frequencies Average pension4
All 1,903 100.00 133,532 100.00 -
Available for work and a®ected by the reform1 235 65.65 11,356 61.66 -
Claiming a survivor bene¯t
- Survivor pension (wage earner) 20 5.59 817 4.44 8,087
- Survivor pension (self employed) 1 0.28 34 0.18 6,460
- Survivor pension (civil servant) 5 1.40 199 1.08 10,799
- Survivor pension (not classi¯ed) - - - - -
Entitled to a survivor bene¯t2 209 58.38 10,306 55.96
Available for work but not a®ected by the reform3 123 34.36 7,062 38.34 -
Widowers
Not weighted Weighted
Number of cases Frequencies Number of cases Frequencies Average pension4
All 8,548 100.00 596,921 100.00 -
Available for work and a®ected by the reform1 1,516 88.65 75,572 89.31 -
Claiming a survivor bene¯t
- Survivor pension (wage earner) 1,006 58.83 49,243 58.19 10,548
- Survivor pension (self employed) 136 7.95 7,547 8.92 6,416
- Survivor pension (civil servant) 184 10.76 8,987 10.62 13,088
- Survivor pension (not classi¯ed) 34 1.99 1,605 1.90 10,218
Entitled to a survivor bene¯t2 156 9.12 8,190 9.68
Available for work but not a®ected by the reform3 194 11.35 9,046 10.69 -
Widows and widowers receiving two or more pensions from di®erent schemes are classi¯ed on the basis of the greatest pension.
1 Individuals a®ected by the reform are widows and widowers claiming or entitled to a survivor bene¯t.
2 Entitlement to a survivor bene¯t has been imputed to all widows and widowers having a labour income.
3 Individuals not a®ected by the reform are widows and widowers not entitled to a survivor bene¯t.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 4: Descriptive statistics (whole population)
Singles Couples
Males Females Males Females
Demographics
Household size 1.34 1.77 3.15
Children under 3 0.01 0.06 0.21
Children from 3 to 6 0.01 0.08 0.22
Children from 6 to 12 0.02 0.18 0.41
Children from 12 to 23 0.06 0.30 0.29
Elderly people (65-75) 0.12 0.06 0.01
Elderly people (over 75) 0.06 0.04 0.01
Age of male (head) 40.57 - 39.74
Age of female (head/spouse) - 41.30 37.44
Living in Wallonia 35.10 36.17 30.79
Living in Flanders 47.82 45.08 61.54
Living in medium cities 47.92 50.25 59.32
Living in big cities 41.06 40.04 25.24
Professional Status
Employee 52.64 43.59 69.48 51.97
Civil servant 11.97 9.01 14.94 8.95
Unemployed 18.40 21.86 7.21 15.04
Inactive 16.99 25.54 8.37 24.04
Self employed - - - -
Retired - - - -
Sick or disabled - - - -
Student - - - -
Labour supply
from 0 to 5 hours 36.01 47.22 15.51 36.43
from 5 to 15 hours 3.02 3.30 2.13 3.90
from 15 to 25 hours 5.26 9.16 4.94 14.62
from 25 to 35 hours 12.64 7.92 15.88 15.06
from 35 to 45 hours 41.84 31.80 59.89 29.65
more than 45 hours 1.23 0.60 1.66 0.34
33Table 5: Descriptive statistics (target group)
Singles Couples
Males Females Males Females
Demographics
Household size 1.61 1.50 2.59
Children under 3 0.01 0.01 0.07
Children from 3 to 6 0.05 0.02 0.08
Children from 6 to 12 0.14 0.10 0.18
Children from 12 to 23 0.37 0.32 0.23
Elderly people (65-75) 0.02 0.02 0.00
Elderly people (over 75) 0.02 0.02 0.02
Age of male (head) 49.83 - 48.47
Age of female (head/spouse) - 53.37 44.77
Living in Wallonia 27.51 40.27 32.79
Living in Flanders 66.09 52.07 63.90
Living in medium cities 52.86 61.08 56.18
Living in big cities 28.17 26.38 27.35
Professional Status
Employee 58.49 22.97 58.89 31.98
Civil servant 33.54 8.19 20.77 7.65
Unemployed 1.36 1.17 10.22 0.96
Inactive 6.61 67.67 10.13 59.42
Self employed - - - -
Retired - - - -
Sick or disabled - - - -
Student - - - -
Survivor bene¯t
Claiming a survivor bene¯t 7.42 87.12 0.90 67.10
Not claiming a survivor bene¯t 92.58 12.88 99.10 32.90
Claiming a survivor bene¯t
from 0 to 5 hours 89.16 80.68 0.00 88.31
from 5 to 15 hours 0.00 2.95 100.00 0.00
from 15 to 25 hours 0.00 14.10 0.00 11.16
from 25 to 35 hours 6.83 1.44 0.00 0.53
from 35 to 45 hours 4.02 0.82 0.00 0.00
more than 45 hours 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Not claiming (or not entitled to) a survivor bene¯t
from 0 to 5 hours 0.82 1.09 18.71 8.40
from 5 to 15 hours 3.02 21.31 3.79 5.49
from 15 to 25 hours 9.36 13.97 3.34 12.76
from 25 to 35 hours 19.37 58.87 20.19 22.12
from 35 to 45 hours 64.11 4.76 53.98 49.89
more than 45 hours 3.31 0.00 0.00 1.35
For single males and single females the labour supply of those not entitled to bene¯ts is zero
by construction, since entitlement was imputed in all cases where labour supply income was
observed. In the case of couples the labour supply ¯gures include the labour supply of the
partners of widows and widowers.
34Table 6: Conditional logit estimation : single males
Log-likelihood -7218.59
Number of observations 6292
Wald ch2 172.36
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Coe±cient Std. Error p-value
®c Age of head -0.0540 0.1896 0.7760
Age of head squared 0.1081 0.0890 0.2240
Children under 3 -0.0061 0.0581 0.9160
Children from 3 to 6 -0.0284 0.0302 0.3470
Children from 6 to 12 0.0185 0.0242 0.4450
Elderly children -0.0227 0.0112 ** 0.0420
Elderly people (65-75) 0.1815 0.0208 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.2164 0.0299 *** 0.0000
Living in medium city 0.0297 0.0233 0.2020
Living in large city 0.0587 0.0245 ** 0.0170
Living in Wallonia 0.0371 0.0205 * 0.0700
Living in Flanders -0.0024 0.0188 0.9000
Constant 0.3588 0.1094 *** 0.0010
®cc -0.0042 0.0005 *** 0.0000
®l Age of head -0.0679 0.0615 0.2690
Age of head squared 0.0695 0.0292 ** 0.0170
Children under 3 0.0016 0.0164 0.9230
Children from 3 to 6 0.0011 0.0101 0.9150
Children from 6 to 12 -0.0012 0.0073 0.8720
Elderly children -0.0149 0.0042 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (65-75) 0.0738 0.0082 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0890 0.0117 *** 0.0000
Living in medium city 0.0133 0.0080 * 0.0940
Living in large city 0.0290 0.0083 *** 0.0000
Living in Wallonia 0.0045 0.0065 0.4900
Living in Flanders -0.0199 0.0061 *** 0.0010
Constant -0.4716 0.0409 *** 0.0000
®ll 0.0046 0.0002 *** 0.0000
®cl -0.0018 0.0004 *** 0.0000
¯ Part-time 0.7975 0.0000 *** 0.0000
Full-time -0.3305 0.0000 *** 0.0000
Irregular working time 6.0881 0.0000 *** 0.0000
*** Coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.001 level;
** coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.005 level;
* coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.01 level.
35Table 7: Conditional logit estimation: single females
Log-likelihood -9935.43
Number of observations 8788
Wald ch2 181.25
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Coe±cient Std. Error p-value
®c Age of head 0.5526 0.2166 ** 0.0110
Age of head squared -0.1400 0.1020 0.1700
Children under 3 -0.0321 0.0254 0.2060
Children from 3 to 6 -0.0169 0.0187 0.3650
Children from 6 to 12 -0.0276 0.0106 *** 0.0090
Elderly children -0.0100 0.0077 0.1940
Elderly people (65-75) 0.2026 0.0278 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0909 0.0293 *** 0.0020
Living in medium city 0.0083 0.0221 0.7090
Living in large city 0.0196 0.0231 0.3960
Living in Wallonia 0.0284 0.0183 0.1200
Living in Flanders -0.0125 0.0172 0.4670
Constant 0.0406 0.1208 0.7370
®cc -0.0035 0.0006 *** 0.0000
®l Age of head -0.0784 0.0602 0.1930
Age of head squared 0.0927 0.0289 *** 0.0010
Children under 3 0.0272 0.0065 *** 0.0000
Children from 3 to 6 0.0120 0.0049 ** 0.0140
Children from 6 to 12 0.0078 0.0030 *** 0.0090
Elderly children 0.0035 0.0023 0.1300
Elderly people (65-75) 0.0876 0.0102 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0501 0.0111 *** 0.0000
Living in medium city 0.0053 0.0061 0.3890
Living in large city 0.0106 0.0064 * 0.0950
Living in Wallonia 0.0123 0.0051 ** 0.0160
Living in Flanders -0.0142 0.0048 *** 0.0030
Constant -0.2312 0.0361 *** 0.0000
®ll 0.0025 0.0001 *** 0.0000
®cl -0.0020 0.0004 *** 0.0000
¯ Part-time 1.3170 0.0000 *** 0.0000
Full-time 0.4052 0.0000 *** 0.0000
Irregular working time 5.4908 0.0000 *** 0.0000
*** Coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.001 level;
** coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.005 level;
* coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.01 level.
36Table 8: Labor Supply Model (couples)
Log-likelihood -65077.39
Number of observations 28555
Wald ch2 340.2200
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Coe±cient Std. Error p-value
®c Age of head 0.2151 0.0675 *** 0.0010
Age of head squared -0.1347 0.0324 *** 0.0000
Age of spouse 0.6357 0.0645 *** 0.0000
Age of spouse squared -0.2742 0.0323 *** 0.0000
Children under 3 -0.0324 0.0059 *** 0.0000
Children from 3 to 6 -0.0027 0.0056 0.6330
Children from 6 to 12 0.0091 0.0039 0.0180
Elderly children 0.0077 0.0043 0.0710
Elderly people (65-75) 0.0777 0.0203 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0703 0.0257 * 0.0060
Living in medium city -0.0079 0.0086 0.3570
Living in large city -0.0029 0.0097 0.7680
Living in Wallonia 0.0382 0.0104 0.0000
Living in Flanders 0.0170 0.0097 0.0780
Constant 0.4525 0.0504 *** 0.0000
®cc -0.0043 0.0002 *** 0.0000
®lm Age of head -0.0222 0.0320 0.4880
Age of head squared 0.0306 0.0153 0.0460
Children under 3 -0.0096 0.0022 *** 0.0000
Children from 3 to 6 0.0039 0.0021 0.0620
Children from 6 to 12 0.0097 0.0015 *** 0.0000
Elderly children 0.0065 0.0017 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (65-75) 0.0502 0.0083 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0377 0.0104 *** 0.0000
Living in medium city -0.0018 0.0032 0.5700
Living in large city 0.0030 0.0036 0.4040
Living in Wallonia 0.0031 0.0037 0.3960
Living in Flanders -0.0109 0.0035 ** 0.0020
Constant -0.1461 0.0236 *** 0.0000
®llm 0.0027 0.0001 *** 0.0000
***
®lf Age of spouse -0.0456 0.0297 0.1250
Age of spouse squared 0.0695 0.0150 *** 0.0000
Children under 3 0.0192 0.0021 *** 0.0000
Children from 3 to 6 0.0153 0.0020 *** 0.0000
Children from 6 to 12 0.0181 0.0014 *** 0.0000
Elderly children 0.0141 0.0016 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (65-75) 0.0362 0.0076 *** 0.0000
Elderly people (over 75) 0.0271 0.0098 ** 0.0050
Living in medium city -0.0012 0.0030 0.6930
Living in large city 0.0032 0.0034 0.3510
Living in Wallonia 0.0130 0.0037 *** 0.0000
Living in Flanders 0.0009 0.0035 0.8040
Constant 0.0239 0.0192 0.2110
®llf 0.0011 0.0001 *** 0.0000
®clm -0.0036 0.0002 *** 0.0000
®clf -0.0023 0.0002 *** 0.0000
®lmlf -0.0005 0.0001 *** 0.0000
¯m Part-time 0.6039 0.0464 *** 0.0000
Full-time -0.2957 0.0255 *** 0.0000
Irregular working time 5.8808 0.0586 *** 0.0000
¯f Part-time 1.4774 0.0322 *** 0.0000
Full-time 0.1508 0.0193 *** 0.0000
Irregular working time 5.0773 0.1060 *** 0.0000
*** Coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.001 level;
** coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.005 level;
* coe±cient signi¯cant at 0.01 level.
Table 12: Change in hours supplied by age bracket
Males Females
Age Target Increase Decrease Net Target Increase Decrease Net
age · 35 862.0 0.8 6.3 -5.5 2423.0 21.0 17.2 3.8
35 < age · 45 2948.0 26.3 14.1 12.1 7467.0 207.6 33.4 174.2
45 < age · 55 5252.0 40.5 50.2 -9.7 17388.0 577.4 72.6 504.8
55 < age · 64 3300.0 26.6 27.2 -0.7 20256.0 262.2 62.7 199.5














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 13: Change in hours supplied by hourly wage bracket
Males Females
Target Increase Decrease Net Target Increase Decrease Net
¹ w 1064.0 13.3 0.0 13.3 23226.0 39.7 0.5 39.2
¹ w < w · 10 1784.0 26.5 6.1 20.4 10118.0 508.6 22.8 485.8
10 < w · 12 1848.0 20.5 5.0 15.5 4953.0 331.2 4.7 326.5
12 < w · 14 2621.0 29.4 16.0 13.4 2779.0 93.0 51.6 41.4
14 < w · 16 1141.0 0.5 26.5 -26.1 2072.0 47.4 21.0 26.5
16 < w · 18 857.0 1.5 14.3 -12.8 1939.0 22.4 40.6 -18.2
18 < w 3047.0 2.5 29.9 -27.4 2447.0 25.8 44.7 -18.8
w is 2001 legal minimum wage, i.e. 6.92 EUR/hour.
Change in hours supplied is expressed in FTEs.
Table 14: Change in hours supplied by survivor pension bene¯t
Males Females
Target Increase Decrease Net Target Increase Decrease Net
0 < sp · 4000 222.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 2704.0 34.8 0.0 34.8
4000 < sp · 6000 178.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 2293.0 74.9 0.3 74.6
6000 < sp · 8000 7707.0 52.5 84.4 -32.0 7005.0 185.8 12.9 172.9
8000 < sp · 10000 1434.0 0.6 4.5 -3.9 6325.0 156.9 1.3 155.6
10000 < sp · 12000 1750.0 33.0 6.0 27.0 16545.0 352.2 123.7 228.5
12000 < sp · 14000 646.0 2.0 2.3 -0.3 6714.0 173.9 6.7 167.2
14000 < sp 425.0 3.3 0.6 2.6 5948.0 89.7 40.9 48.7
Change in hours supplied is expressed in FTEs.
Table 15: Change in hours supplied by income quintile
Males Females
Quintile Target Increase Decrease Net Increase Decrease Net
1 2,145 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.1 0.0 44.1
2 6,614 16.1 0.0 16.1 114.8 0.0 114.8
3 14,869 41.7 5.4 36.4 257.9 8.7 249.1
4 19,055 11.3 29.9 -18.6 494.9 52.4 442.6
5 11,565 25.0 62.6 -37.6 156.5 124.8 31.7
Change in hours supplied is expressed in FTEs.
Households with self employed have been excluded.
Equivalence scale is squared root of household size.
41Table 16: Change in disposable income after the reform and
after behavioural adjustments by equivalent income quintile
Gainers (before behavioural reaction)
Quintile Target (0,5] (5,10] (10,15] (15,20] (20,25] (25,1]
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 76 0 50 25 119 51 34
3 834 772 543 354 485 239 412
4 1813 1222 1304 1066 309 309 0
5 2328 2225 945 307 0 51 51
Losers (before behavioural reactions)
Quintile Target (0,5] (5,10] (10,15] (15,20] (20,25] (25,1]
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 76 17 0 0 0 0 0
3 834 455 85 0 0 0 0
4 1813 1665 170 76 0 0 0
5 2328 1329 394 206 0 0 0
Gainers (after behavioural reaction)
Quintile Target (0,5] (5,10] (10,15] (15,20] (20,25] (25,1]
1 9,309 608 206 0 0 0 103
2 10,652 1,287 596 265 51 85 34
3 13,595 4,592 1,991 740 298 393 309
4 18,746 5,466 3,540 569 600 309 103
5 11,514 6,480 1,277 308 153 0 0
Losers (after behavioural reactions)
Quintile Target (0,5] (5,10] (10,15] (15,20] (20,25] (25,1]
1 2,145 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 6,614 161 34 51 34 0 25
3 14,869 1,628 290 51 0 0 0
4 19,055 2,657 170 308 103 0 0
5 11,565 1,197 452 0 103 206 0
The number of a®ected households in the ¯rst two quadrant refers to the
static situation (i.e. the number of households experiencing a change in
disposable income at the given labour supply). When allowing for be-
havioural reactions we consider all households, whose budget constraint
is modi¯ed, irrespective of their current labour supply.
Equivalence scale is squared root of household size.
Households with self employed have been excluded.
42Table 17: Change in budgetary aggregates and in gross labour income after the
reform and after behavioural adjustments
Before the reform After the reform After adjustment
Single Males
Gross labour income 216,096 216,096 214,529
Employees' SSC 28,337 28,642 28,461
Employers' SSC 49,697 49,697 49,559
Social bene¯ts 52,714 62,783 63,267
Personal Income Tax 61,703 65,447 65,016
Single Females
Gross labour income 252,187 252,187 268,605
Employees' SSC 76,516 76,807 78,706
Employers' SSC 58,092 58,092 64,007
Social bene¯ts 818,199 828,356 824,833
Personal Income Tax 195,868 195,868 195,868
Couples
Gross labour income 189,309 189,309 190,815
Employees' SSC 27,787 27,886 28,059
Employers' SSC 50,517 50,517 51,143
Social bene¯ts 96,261 100,009 99,616
Personal Income Tax 56,670 58,136 58,612
Others
Gross labour income 774,605 774,605 774,605
Employees' SSC 132,009 132,164 132,164
Employers' SSC 216,547 216,547 216,547
Social bene¯ts 625,925 633,359 633,359
Personal Income Tax 252,801 255,591 255,591
Total
Gross labour income 1,432,197 1,432,197 1,448,553
Employees' SSC 264,649 265,499 267,390
Employers' SSC 374,853 374,853 381,255
Social bene¯ts 1,593,099 1,624,508 1,621,075
Personal Income Tax 567,042 575,043 575,088
Cost of the reform -22,557 -10,786
43Figure 1: Low wage widow(er)
Figure 2: Medium wage widow(er)
Figure 3: High wage widow(er)
Survivor pension: 10,000 EUR/year, no dependent children. children
44Figure 4: Widow(er) with low survivor pension
Figure 5: Widow(er) with medium survivor pension
Figure 6: Widow(er) with high survivor pension
Wage rate: 13,000 EUR/year, no dependent children children
45Figure 7: Sample selection and modelling strategy
*at least one partner available for the labour market
**only youngsters living as singles or in couple.
46Figure 8: Observed and predicted frequencies (Single males)
Figure 9: Observed and predicted frequencies (Single females)
47Figure 10: Observed and predicted frequencies (Males in couples - both °exible)
Figure 11: Observed and predicted frequencies (Females in couples - both °exible)
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